By Morgen Makombo Sikwila
The application of security sector reform in new democratic societies is increasingly accepted as a vital part of the restoration of peace.
Post-conflict countries are often characterized by weak state institutions, fragile political situations, tensions and insecurity among various communal groups, oversized and influential armed actors and precarious economic conditions. Many post-conflict countries also lack the structures to provide physical security to their citizens. Some security environments may be too adverse to implement effective security sector reform programs.
Security sector reform is a process by which countries formulate, reorientation or develop policies, structures and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more effective, efficient and responsive to democratic control and to allow them to better respond to the security and justice challenges confronting the state and its population. Depending on the context and focus, security sector reform is sometimes expressed as a security sector governance, security sector transformation, security sector development, security sector review, security system reform as well as security and justice reform.
The challenges of security sector reforms in new democracies is fundamental for two reasons: military, police and intelligence organisations may be required to play key role in protecting the new political dispensation and the rights of citizens, but they can subvert those rights and undermine or destroy the democratic project.
The obstacles to security sector reform in emerging democracies are varied. They include a lack of vision, expertise and resources; an abiding tendency to view security in an authoritarian, militarist and secretive fashion; resistance to reforms by politicians and or security officers; manipulation foreign powers and neighbouring states; and the on-going politisation of the security services. The higher the level of instability and violence in the national arena, the less likely it is that reforms with anti-militarist orientation will be introduced.
Security sector reform in post-conflict or new democracies can be very complex because of the number of policies that have to be transformed. The policies may have to be changed more or less simultaneously and the radical nature of the transformation agenda in the light of security culture under authoritarian rule. The management of complex policy and institutional change would tax even the strongest governments. It can be overwhelming to a new government that even has prior experience in running a state.
What distinguishes security sector reforms in post-conflict contexts from other contexts is that it has to deal with the legacy of past conflict. Activities such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration controlling small arms and light weapons,clearance of anti-personnel landmines and establishing and strengthening the rule of law are all considered to be key elements in security sector reconstruction, but not necessarily in security sector reform activities in development or security transformation contexts.
The problem of complexity in security sector reform is likely to be compounded by a lack of organisational, managerial, planning, financial and policy expertise in the new government. Leading a liberation movement or guerrilla army is hardly comparable with running government departments and conventional security services. The inexperience of new office holders can lead to tension between them and security officers. The officers might come to believe that the new office holders are ignorant and irresponsible and the office holders might feel that the officers are deliberately obfuscating matters in order to maintain the status quo. Adversarial relations impede the transformation project and can retard the democratic process.
Democratic governance is not limited to respect for basic rights, pluralism and the other basic features of democracy. It also entails efficiency and effectiveness in fulfilling the functions of the state. These qualities are absent in most developing countries, which lack the skills, expertise, infrastructure and resources to meet the welfare and security needs of citizens. Without requisite institutional capacity, the values and principles of democracy cannot be operationalised and insecurity might remain pervasive. It is not unlikely that the state and sector of civil society will seek to fill the security vacuum in a militarist setup.
Members of the security services may oppose reforms for a host of ideological and political reasons. Moreover, substantial organisational and policy transformation is inherently threatening and would give rise to resistance and conflict in most countries. This is especially the case in respect of conventional armed forces, which tend to be conservative given their primary function of defending the nation. In fragile new democracies where political sector is weak and the security sector is strong, politicians might rely on the overt or tacit support of the security services to maintain their tenuous hold on power. They may avoid substantial reforms for fear of provoking a coup or lesser forms of resistance.
To a great extent, militarisation in developing countries is a product of structural conditions that constitute a crisis for human security and or the stability of the state. The conditions include authoritarian rule; the exclusion of minorities from governance; socio-economic deprivation combined with inequity; and weak states that are unable to manage normal societal conflict in a stable and consensual way. These conditions give rise to a security vacuum that the state, civil society groups and individuals seek to fill through the use of violence, sometimes in an organised and sustained way and at other times in a spontaneous and sporadic fashion. The prospect of disarmament in such circumstances is limited. While the problem of authoritarianism may be largely resolved with the introduction of democracy, other structural problems emerging democracies continue to pose obstacles to disarmament. If people are hungry and have negligible economic opportunities, then some of them can turn to crime and banditry a means of subsistence. If the state is to weak to maintain law and , then criminal activity may flourish and communities can end up privatising security. If the state lacks the capacity to resolve the normal political and social conflicts that characterise all societies, then at least some individuals and groups will settle their disputes through violence.
There are no quick fix solutions to the problem of security sector reforms in new democracies. The international community should avoid the assumptions that their models can be replicated easily or, indeed, that these models are appropriate in every respect to societies everywhere. Democratic principles that are taken for granted in the North are truly radical in societies emerging from authoritarian rule, and the organisational capacity that is taken for granted in the North may be entirely absent in developing countries. The difficulties and obstacles related to formulating and implementating new policy on security and defence are substantial. Success is unlikely to be attained if the reforms are not shaped and embraced by the new government, civil society and the security institutions themselves.
Morgen Makombo Sikwila
Masters in Peace and Governance
BSc Counselling
Diploma in Environmental Health
Certificate in Marketing Management
email address: morgensikwilam@gmail.com
Phone number: 0772823282
